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THE VIOLENCE OF
SYMPATHY
Adam Smith
on
Resentment and Executions
Robert Mitchell

he concept of "sympathy" stands at the center of the
moral theory developed by Adam Smith in The Theory
of Moral Sentiments (1759), and most commentators
seem to be in agreement that Smith understands sympathy as an
essentially "progressive" social force, one that contributes to an
increase of social bonding and unity. We might take as representative
of these readings David Marshall's claim, that, for Smith, "sympathy
has a social function," which it serves by "forc[ing] us to moderate our
passions in order to create a 'harmony and concord with the emotions'
of those who are watching us."' Within this reading, sympathy creates
social unity, and social unity is understood as an unequivocal good.
"[SJympathy," writes Christopher Lawrence, "and therefore social
bonding, increases with the progress of society."^
( C^j/

' David Marshall, The Fiff/re of Theater: Shaftesbuiy, Drfoe, Adam Smith, and George Eliot (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1986), 173.
^ Christopher Lawrence, "The Nervous System and Society in the Scottish Enlightenment," in
Barry Barnes and Steven Shapin, eds.. NaturalOrder: Historical Studies of SeientijicCulture (Beverly
Hills; Sage Publications, 1979), 32.
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While this interpretation of the social function of sympathy within
Smith's system is valid, it is insufficient, for it ignores a critical element
of sympathy and its capacity to produce "concord." Smith takes pains
to point out that not all the social unities are pacific in nature. He
suggests that in some circumstances, sympathy initiates social conflict
by creating the psychological conditions for factional strife and violent
acts of revenge. While Smith frequently extols the capacity of
sympathy to produce a "pleasurable unity" of social beings, this is not
its most fundamental social function. Rather, as I will outline in this
paper. Smith argues that before all else, sympathy maintains the social
bond by controlling the cases of resentment and violence that it
initiates. Smith argues that this fundamental function of sympathy
operates in the interests of "justice," and, as such, maintains the social
bond in ways that a pleasurable "concord of sentiment" cannot.
Standing as the symbol of this connection between violence and
sympathy is the state-sponsored execution, which exemplifies the
capacity of sympathy to resolve the very conflicts that it creates.
Through the action of sympathy, criminal actions generate contagious
resentment, which threatens to undo the social bond. However, the
execution of the condemned allows justice to prevail, while at the same
time attending to the need for sympathy on the part of both the
condemned and the execution spectators.
I develop these claims in the first two sections of this paper,
concentrating first on Smith's analysis of resentment as developed in
sections II.i-II.i.5.11 ofThe Theory of Moral Sentiments, and then turning
to Smith's discussion of executions.^ In my third section, I situate
Smith's claims about resentment and executions in his political and
historical context, arguing that we should read his comments as in part

' Despite the extensive bibliography of commentary on The Theoty of Moral Sentiments, Smith's
discussion of resentment is generally given short shrift. The only discussions I have been able to
locate are the following; T. D. Campbell, AdamSmith's Saena o/Morab (London: George Allen &
Unwin Ltd., 1971), 190-93, 211; a medium-length footnote in John Dwyer's TheAff of Passions:
An Interpretation ofAdam Smith andScottishEnlightenment CuUure (EastLinton: Tuckwell Press,1998),
30 note 51; J. Salter, "Sympathy with the Poor: Theories of Punishment in Grotius and Smith,"
Histoiy ofPoliticalThought, 20:2 (Summer 1999), 205-24, which provides a useful discussion of the
legal implications of Smith's theory of resentment; ChristopherJ. P>etvj,SocialTheoty of theScottish
Enlightenment (Edinburgh: Edinbu^h University Press,1997), 131—34, which very briefly relates
Smith's theory of resentment to that of several of his predecessors. This lacuna in the secondary
literature is puzzling, given that Smith's discussion of resentment occupies more than 20 pages
in The Theoty of Moral Sentiments.
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a response to political developments in the 1740s and early 1750s, and
especially to the failed Stuart Rebellion of 1745 and the executions of
many of its leaders. Citing evidence from texts such as the Lectures on
jurisprudence and Smith's correspondence, I argue that the connections
between sympathy, resentment, and executions in The Theory of Moral
Sentiments should be read as Smith's attempt to position the rebellion
and its consequences as serving the interests of both "sentiment" and
the political goals of England and the Scottish literati.

I. Sympathy and Resentment in Smith's
The Theory of Moral Sentiments
While "sympathy" had been an important element within the tradition
of moral sense philosophy that induded Hutcheson, Shaftesbury, and
Hume, Adam Smith locates the term at the center of the moral
philosophy that he develops in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Smith
defines sympathy as "our fellow-feeling with any passion whatsoever"
(I.i.1.5), and situates the faculty of the imagination as the causal
mechanism of its action. He suggests that when we perceive an
individual expressing an emotion of any sort, we imaginatively duplicate
that emotion in oursdves. So, for example, when we see someone dse
suffering,
[b]y the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we
conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter
as it were into his body, and become in some measure the
same person with him....His agonies, when they are thus
brought home to oursdves, when we have thus adopted
them and made them our own, begin at last to affect us, and
we then tremble and shudder at the thought of what he
feels."*

* Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1984), I.i.1.2. All
citations are referenced in the customary fashion, that is, part-section-chapter-paragraph of the
original 1759 edition (e.g, III.ii.1.3).
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Smith then employs this definition and description of sympathy to
explain the origins of our various moral judgments of approbration and
disapprobration, as well as the origins of the actions that we take with
regard to rewarding and punishing others. Moreover, sympathy is cited
to explain the mechanisms of many modes of "group phenomena,"
including the aesthetic responses of theater spectators (II.i.5.3), the
admiration of the rich by the poor (and by extension, the origin of class
divisions) (I.iii.2.3), the origins of patriotism and soldierly self-sacrifice
(VI.ii.2.2), and the emergence of revenge cycles (II.ii.1.7). For Smith,
the effects of sympathy are present in virtually every social relation, and
understanding the dynamics of the social field requires that one
understand the laws and limits of sympathy.®
One of the most important functions of sympathy, according to
Smith, is its capacity to produce a "concord" of sentiment amongst a
group of people. In his various discussions of this phenomenon, Smith
often focuses on cases of social concord that exemplify either an
increase of collective pleasure or a decrease of collective suffering. The
pleasure of seeing others feel as we do, Smith claims, is the highest of
aU pleasures ("nothing pleases us more than to observe in other men
a fellow-feeling with all the emotions of our own breast" (I.i.2.1)), and
as a result we are able unconsciously to moderate our emotional state
to allow for a sympathetic concord. In the case of someone who loses
a son, for example, the suffering individual "longs for that relief which
nothing can afford him but the entire concord of the affections of the
spectators with his own," yet he unconsciously recognizes that this
concord can be achieved only if he "lower[s] his passion to that pitch,
in which the spectators are capable of going along with him" (I.i.3.7).
' As a result of the centrality of sympadiy to The Theory ofMondSentiments, almostevery secondary
piece on Smith's text discusses this term at length, which makes unfeasible a complete list of
secondary sources. However, some of the more useful accounts include Deidre Dawson, "Is
Sympathy so Surprising? Adam Smith and French Fictions of Sympathy," Eighteenth-Centuty IJfe
15 (February & May 1991), 147-62, in which Dawson traces the impact of French sentiment
literature on the successive editions to TheTheory of Moral Sentimentr,]. Ralph lindgren.The Social
Vhihsophy cf Adam Smith (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), 2-59, which includes a useful
discussion of sympathy as well as an account of the psychological model upon which Smith's
notion is foimded; Dwyer, The Age of Passions, one of the more readable attempts to relate Smith's
moral to his economic theory, as well as a useful account of the ways in which some of Smith's
followers such as John Millar and Adam Ferguson attempted to apply Smith's theory of sympathy
to issues of national identity; and chapter seven of Marshall, The Figure of Theater, in which
Marshall discusses in depth the importance of theatrical metaphors within Smith's account of
sympathy.
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The sufferer is able to do this by sympathi2ing with those indifferent
spectators around him^ for
[a]s their sympathy makes them look at [his situation], in
some measure, with his eyes, so his sympathy makes him
look at it, in some measure, with theirs, especially when in
their presence and acting under their observation: and as the
reflected passion, which he thus conceives, is much weaker
than the original one, it necessarily abates the violence of
what he felt before he came into their presence. (I.i.4.8)
The desire for sympathetic concord in fact allows the sufferer to suffer
less, and thus produces this concord itself.
Smith's example highlights the fact that one of the primary
positive social effects of sympathy is the moderation of emotional
differences between members of a group, such that a unity of senti
ment is achieved. Sympathy, notes Smith, "enlivens joy and alleviates
grief (I.i.2.2). Given this, we might be inclined to conclude that the
"final cause" of sympathy—that is, the end which the mechanism of
sympathy tends to produce—^is the pleasurable unification of society.
Sympathy overcomes the isolation of individuals, binding groups
together through shared happiness, and turning outcasts (e.g., the lone
sufferer) into one of the group.
Yet however much sympathy might facilitate the unification of
society, its capacity to produce emotional "concord" harbors a more
problematic possibility. Let us suppose, for example, that the man
from the example above "lost" his son not to disease, but through civil
strife or war. In this situation, the sufferer may find himself positioned
between two antagonistic groups, one of which is responsible for his
suffering. Within Smith's model, what sort of unity would sympathy
generate in this circumstance, and towards what "end" would this
unification tend? It is not at all clear that the occasion of the man's
suffering would serve to bind together these two groups through a
shared increase in pleasure or a collective decrease in suffering, for one
of these groups was itself responsible for the suffering in the first place.
Smith takes up these sorts of questions in the section of his text
entitled "Of MERIT and DISMERIT; or, the Objects of REWARD
and PUNISHMENT," wherein we find a very different representation
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of the "final cause" of sympathy, one focused around the concepts of
resentment and revenge.
In this section, Srmth outlines the ways in which sympathy
operates to enable us to judge others as deserving of reward (merit) or
punishment (demerit). At the basis of our judgments of merit and
dismerit are the sentiments of gratitude and resentment, for we judge
someone meritorious when we feel grateful to that person, and
conversely we judge someone as dismeritorious when we feel resentful
toward that individual. Smith acknowledges that much of our gratitude
and resentment is grounded in self-interest; for example, we feel
grateful when someone directly benefits us. Yet our gratitude and
resentment also can be sympathetically extended to our companions.
So, for example, "[w]hen we see one man assisted, protected, relieved
by another, our sympathy with the joy of the person who receives the
benefit serves only to animate our fellow-feeling with his gratitude
towards him who bestows it" (II.i.2.5). In similar fashion, sympathy
focuses emotions such as anger and abhorrence toward the parties
responsible for producing a companion's suffering in the first place, for
"as we sympathize with the sorrows of our fellow-creature whenever
we see his distress, so we likewise enter into his abhorrence and
aversion for whatever has given occasion to it" (II.i.2.5).
Yet more significantly, these sympathetically.generated sentiments
of gratitude and resentment also encourage us to ^/rflike our compan
ion or friend. We help those towards whom we feel gratitude, and we
even harm those towards whom we feel sympathetic resentment
(II.i.2.5). In an especially vivid example. Smith cites sympathetic
resentment as the cause of revenge, asking his readers to imagine a
situation in which "we see one man oppressed and injured by another."
In this situation. Smith argues, "[w]e are rejoiced to see him attack his
adversary in his turn, and are eager and ready to assist him whenever he
exerts himself for defence, or even for vengeance within a certain
degree." And should this object of our sympathy be slain—that is, "[i]f
the injured should perish in the quarrel"—we are literally possessed by
his spirit of resentment, for
we not only sympathize with the real resentment of his
friends and relations, but with the imaginary resentment
which in fancy we lend to the dead...as we put ourselves in
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his situation, as we enter, as it were, into his body, and in our
imaginations, in some measure, animate anew the deformed
and mangled carcass of the slain, when we bring home in this
manner his case to our own bosoms....We feel that resent
ment which we imagine he ought to feel, and which he would
feel, if in his cold and lifeless body there remained any
consciousness of what passes on earth. (II.i.2.5)
Revenge and blood feuds, then, are the result of an imaginary posses
sion of the living by the dead, as the spirits of the living are forced to
sympathetically "animate" and play out the antagonistic desires of the
departed.
Smith's focus on the violence inherent in resentment, in combina
tion with his suggestion that we tend to restrict our sympathetic
gratitude and resentment to our local party of companions, highlights
the possibility that in some circumstances, sympathy may serve to work
against any widespread social unity, insofar as sympathetic resentment
creates factions within society. For while the friends of the "injured"
party will certainly be motivated by resentment to take revenge on the
perceived aggressor, what is then to prevent the friends of the
aggressor from protecting or avenging their own companion? The
introduction of acts of violence within the social field threatens to
transform sympathy into a disruptive force that binds together one set
of individuals only at the expense of any widespread social bonding.
Smith acknowledges this, noting that "[t]he moment that injury begins,
the moment that mutual resentment and animosity take place, all the
bands of [society] are broke asunder, and the different members of
which it consisted are, as it were, dissipated and scattered abroad by the
violence and opposition of their discordant affections" (II.ii.3.3). It is
vital to note that disruption and dissipation are not autonomous forces
working counter to sympathy, but rather are facilitated ^ sympathy
itself. Sympathy, in other words, disrupts society as much as it binds
it together.
Smith attempts to resolve this problem by suggesting that
sympathy facilitates our ability to distinguish "proper" from "im
proper" cases of gratitude and resentment. He argues that the ripple
like expansion of the sentiments of gratitude and resentment from our
own person to the circle of our companions should indicate to us that
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these sentiments are most "proper" when they become universal, that
is, when our sympathetic gratitude or resentment is with no particular
person or party, but rather with the "impartial spectator," that simulac
rum that represents all people. Thus, claims Smith, the sentiments of
gratitude and resentment
seem proper and approved of, when the heart of every
impartial spectator entirely sympathizes with them, when
every indifferent by-stander entirely enters into, and goes
along with them.
He, therefore, appears to deserve reward, who, to some
person or persons, is the natural object of a gratitude which
every human heart is disposed to beat time to, and thereby
applaud: and he, on the other hand, appears to deserve
punishment, who in the same manner is to some person or
persons the natural object of a resentment which the breast
, of every reasonable man is ready to adopt and sympathize
with. (II.i.2.3)
Moreover, while we may initially sympathize with the resentment of an
injured party, should we subsequently come to judge that individual's
resentment as "excessive," our support will wither. Thus, writes Smith,
"this too violent resentment, instead of carrying us along with it,
becomes itself the object of our resentment and indignation. We enter
into the opposite resentment of the person who is the object of this
unjust emotion, and who is in danger of suffering from it" (II.i.5.8).
Smith thus holds out the possibility that sympathy is able to correct its
own excesses, directing our attention away from improper and toward
proper opportunities for sympathizing.
Smith contends that "injuries" (to our own person or others) are
the proper objects of resentment, and justice names the virtue that
ensures that resentment will be provoked (II.ii.1.5). As a result, justice
is vital to the maintenance of society. Without it, society will "break
asunder" the moment that resentment enters the social field (II.ii.3.3).
As a result, the observance of justice "is not left to the freedom of our
wills, [and] may [thus] be extorted by force" (II.ii.1.5). The final cause
of justice, then—-that is, the reason that Nature has "implanted in the
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human breast" the sense of justice—^is the preservation of society.® Yet
this "implanted" feeling of justice is not sufficient on its own, and it
must be supplemented by a power capable of occupying the position
of the "impartial spectator" and enforcing the dictates of justice. This
power is, of course, the state, and its capacity to "extor[t] by force" the
observance of justice depends upon both the threat and the use of
violence, up to and induing the capacity to execute individuals. The
civH magistrate. Smith notes, has the power of "preserving the public
peace by restraining injustice," and to disobey the commands of the
"sovereign" is "not only blamable but punishable" (II.ii.1.8). Were
everyone immediately capable of sympathizing with the impartial
spectator, these institutions of sovereignty might be unnecessary, but
because individuals tend to restrict their sympathies to their compan
ions, the state becomes the necessary servant of justice.

11. Sympathy, Fear, and Death:
The Consolation of Executions
The fact that the observance of justice may—and in some cases,
must—^be extorted by force might appear to signal Smith's acknowl
edgment that sympathy is not in fact able to regulate itself; that in some
circumstances it requires an external "check" to prevent the contagious
spread of factionalization. We might be tempted to conclude that in
instances of social strife, "sympathy" and "fear" operate as opposed
forces, the latter supporting the institutions of justice that prevent
sympathy from encouraging the spread of violence. Yet in fact fear and
justice cannot be distinguished easily from sympathy, for the fear that
underwrites justice is itself based on sympathy. Moreover, Smith argues,
state-sponsored executions do not so much oppose sympathetically

'Smith caDs the "propei" object ofgratitude bin^cmee. Unlike justice, beneficence is not vital for
the maintenance of society. Thus, while we will always reward beneficence, we do not reallyforce
people to be beneficent beneficence is "always free, it cannot beextorted by force, [and] themere
want of it exposes to no punishment" (II.ii.1.3). "Society may subsist,"writes Smith,"thou^ not
in the most comfortable state, without beneficence; but the prevalence of injustice must utterly
destroy it" (II.ii.3.3). Beneficence is the"ornament which embellishes, not the foundation which
supports the building"; justice, on the other hand, "is the main pillar that upholds the whole
edifice" (llji.3.4).
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generated antagonisms as present occasions through which these
tensions resolve themselves.
The conclusion that the fear upon which justice depends is
enabled by sympathy is notimmediately obvious from Smith's account
of the mechanism of justice. He argues that the sense of justice
operates by turning our gaze toward the possibility of our own harm or
death. Thus, when we contemplate the commission of an unjust act,
we instandy become aware of the possibility that others wiU revenge
themselves upon us. "In order to enforce the observation of justice,
therefore," writes Smith, "Nature has implanted in the human breast
that consciousness of iU-desert, those terrors of merited punishment
which attend upon its violation" (II.ii.3.4). The fear of resentment and
punishment (and, standing as the logical end result of these fears, the
fear of death) force us to restrain our own desires and concerns and
attend to the concerns and cares of others. Justice, operating through
the fear of death, "ovetawe[s] [potential aggressors] into a respect for
their innocence," for without this, "they would, like wild beasts, be at
all times ready to fly upon him" (II.ii.3.4). Justice, then, would seem to
achieve its end solely within the realm of self-interest, rather than
sympathy; that is, it seems to employ self-interest against itself, curbing
most of our self-interested desires via an appeal to our most fundamen
tal self-interested desire, the desire for life.
Yet underlying and enabling this economy of fear and self-interest
is sympathy once again, since the fear of resentment that justice
requires depends on sympathy. We are able to conclude that others
will resent us only because we are able to sympathize with them,
placing ourselves in their situation, and thus foreseeing their fears,
desires, and actions. We cannot fear the other until we have sympathet
ically "become" the other. Second, and more fundamentally, our fear
of death (the backdrop against which our moral choices unfold) is
possible only on the basis of sympathy. Smith argues that even our
own death does not reaUy "belong" to us, for we come to fear death
only by first sympathizing with the dead. The "foresight of our own
dissolution is so terrible to us" only because we imagine ourselves in
the place of the dead other. Thus, writes Smith,
The idea of that dreary and endless melancholy, which the
fancy naturally ascribes to their condition [i.e., the condition
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of the dead], arises altogether from our joining to the change
which has been produced upon them, our own consciousness
of that change, from our putting ourselves in their situation,
and from our lodging, if I may be allowed to say so, our own
living souls in theirinanimated bodies,and thence conceiving
what would be our emotions in this case. It is from this very
illusion of the imagination, that the foresight of our own
dissolution is so terrible to us, and that idea of those circum
stances, which undoubtedly can give us no pain when we are
dead, makes us miserable when we are alive. And from
thence arises one of the most important principles in human
nature, the dread of death, the great poison to the happiness,
but the great restraint upon the injustice of mankind, which,
while it afflicts and mortifies the individual, guards and
protects the society. (I.i.1.13)
Justice may thus require the self-interested fear of death for its
operation, but this fear of death itself requires an anterior sympathy
with the dead. The maintenance of social relations requires justice,
justice requires resentment and fear, and these require sympathy. Thus,
the most fundamental function of sympathy is to maintain the social
bond in ways that sympathetic pleasure cannot by controlling its own
tendency to create resentment and propagate violence.
In a rather surprising twist, then. Smith's emphasis on the role of
sympathy in maintaining social harmony through violence and the fear
of death aUgns his position with that sketched out by Hobbes, despite
the fact that Smith mounts a lengthy critique of the author of Leinathan
in the final part of The Theory of Moral Sentiments (see Section
VII.iii.2.1fQ. Smith objects to Hobbes's claim that all human actions
are motivated by self-interest, and he takes pains to highlight the fact
that sympathy "cannot, in any sense, be regarded as a selfish principle"
(VII.iii.1.4). Yet while sympathy itself may not be a selfish principle—^it
is, as noted before, simply the psychological mechanism that causes an
imaginary transposition of positions—^it can certainly serve to facilitate
certain selfish thoughts and actions. Smith's objection to Hobbes thus
obscures the fact that both believe that society can be maintained only
through the fear of death operating in conjunction with a sovereign
power. Smith differs from Hobbes on this point only in his attempt to
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specify precisely the psychological mechanism that inctilcates this fear,
pinpointing sympathy as the efficient cause of fear.
An index of the importance of the state and violence to Smith's
account is registered in his discussions of state-sponsored executions.
Smith argues that executions, unlike other forms of punishments—for
example, pillory or caning—^allow for the mediation of both public and
private interests, for they permit the condemned individual to receive
the sympathy of spectators while at the same time serving the interests
of the public. "A brave man," Smith writes,
is not rendered contemptible by being brought to the
scaffold; he is, by being set in the pillory. His behavior in the
one situation may gain him universal esteem and admiration.
No behaviour in the other can render him agreeable. The
sympathy of the spectators supports him in the one case, and
saves him from that shame, that consciousness that his
misery is felt by himself only. (I.iii.2.10)
Moreover, the execution allows the condemned to escape from his own
sympathetically-generated isolation. Smith claims that the "violator of
the laws of justice" will begin to detest himself, since "[bjy sympathiz
ing with the hatred and abhorrence which other men must entertain for
him, he becomes in some measure the object of his own hatred and
abhorrence" (II.ii.2.3). He is caught between the desire to "fly off to
some inhospitable desert, where he might never more behold the face
of a human creature" and his need to remain among people, for
"solitude is more dreadful than society" (II.ii.2.3). Yet in both cases he
is effectively isolated. This impossible and insufferable position can be
resolved should the condemned face his death "with resolution," for
then "he can, with propriety, assume the air, not only of perfect
serenity, but of triumph and exaltation" (I.iii.2.10).' Only in this
manner can the violator be reunited with society, though it is a rather
temporary reunion to be sure.
Executions thus become instantiations of the function of justice,
for. Smith argues, they prompt only proper resentment. • Smith
'Smith does qualify this slightly,suggesting that the crime cannot be of so degrading a nature as
to irrevocably "deprive him of the respectof others" (I.iii:2.10),buthe does not provide examples
of this category of crime.
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argues—admittedly against the realities of eighteenth-century
executions—that "[w]hen an inhuman murderer is brought to the
scaffold, though we have some compassion for his misery, we can have
no sort of fellow-feeling with his resentment" (II.i.3.2). Executions
thus resolve the threat of ever-expanding resentment. They allow the
people a state-sponsored opportunity to draw the lessons that they
should have drawn from simply observing the ripple-like spread of
sympathy in other cases. They learn that resentment is only proper
when it is "universal," which in this case means applied by the official
state. Sympathy, for Smith, ensures justice and therefore the preserva
tion of society, but it does so only by revealing the threat of a Hobbesian state of all against all and allowing us to approve of the actuality of
state-sponsored violence.

III. Sympathy, Executions, and the
Stuart Rebellion
The links between sympathy, conflict, violence, and death were not for
Smith limited to his moral theory. They also served to locate his
discussion within a tradition of moral discussion on the relationships
between executions and sympathy initiated by Hutcheson and
Shaftesbury and most recently taken up by Hume and Burke. More
over, at a "political" level. Smith's emphasis on the connections
between sympathy and violence should be read against the political
history of Scotland in the 1740s and '50s, for one of the unarticulated
referents of Smith's discussion was the failed Stuart rebellion of 1745
and its bloody aftermath.
Smith's relationship to previous moral sense theorists is worth
developing at greater length, for his union of sympathy to violence and
executions was not idiosyncratic, but was instead a regional variant
within a much wider contemporary discourse on the proper role of
emotion in state-sponsored violence. Earlier eighteenth-century moral
theorists such as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson had tended to deny any
connection between execution spectatorship and morally valid
emotions such as sympathy,Shaftesbury arguing, for example, that only
an "unnatural passion" could generate "delight in beholding
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torments."® However, as V. A .C. Gatrell has demonstrated in The
Hanging Tree: Execution and the English People, 1770-1868, by mid-century,
the polarity between executions and morally valid sentiments such as
sympathy had been reversed.' Hume, for example, implicitly connected
the two phenomena in A Treatise of Human Nature (1739/40) differenti
ating public hangings from public tortures precisely by the capacity of
the former to elicit sympathy from spectators. Hume writes that
[t]hus we find, that tho' every one, but especially women, are
apt to contract a kindness for criminals, who go to the
scaffold, and readily imagine them to be uncommonly
handsome and well-shap'd; yet one, who is present at the
execution of the rack, feels no such tender emotions; but is
in a manner overcome with horror, and has no leisure to
temper this uneasy sensation by any opposite sympathy.'"
Edmund Burke had also proposed a connection between executions
and sympathy in his Philosophical Enquiry on the sublime and beautiful.
Burke argued that sympathy was one of several "social passions" that
ensured the bonding of society, and yet also suggested that statesponsored executions of criminals of "high rank" allowed for the
expression and "triumph of real sympathy.""
' Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men,Manners, Opinions, Times
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 225-27. Shaftesbury also had connected what
he variously called "the herding principle"and "close sympathy" with the formation of ftictions,
suggesting that this was a natural effect "when the society grows vast and bulky" (Shaftesbury,
Characteristics, 52-53).
' V. A .C Gatrell's The Hangng Tree: Execution and the English People, 1770-1868 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1994) is an indispensable source for tracking the connections between
theories of sympathy and executions, and Gatrell acknowledges the importance of Smith's theory
of sympathy for subsequent British moral theory. Yet Gatrell makes relatively little mention of
Smith's discussionof executions, citingSmith in connection with executionsonly once (37). This
is probably a function of the fact that Gatrell himself understands sympathy as something that
by its nature works against executions. (For evidence of this assertion, see especially Chapter 10
of his book, entided "Executing 'Social Others."') Peter Linebaugh's The London Hanged: Crime
and Civil Society in the Eighteenth Century (London: The Penguin Press, 1991), provides a more
geographically-specific, yet still extremely useful,overview of the connections between sentiment
and executions. For a concise overview of the pragmatics of executions in the eighteenth century,
see Frank McLynn, Crime and Punishment in Eighteenth-Centun England
Oxford University
Press, 199^, 257-76.
David Hume,.^ Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1978), 388.
" Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origins of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful
(Notre Dame: Utiiversity of Notre Dame Press, 1968), 47.
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In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, then, Smith is one sense simply
expanding on a position previously articulated by both Hume and
Burke. Like Hume, Smith argues that executions are qualitatively
distinguished from "degrading" punishments such as pillory or caning
to the extent that executions allow for the operation of sympathy. And
where Burke had simply implied that sympathy would not turn the
crowd against the executioners and the state. Smith is explicit on this
point, arguing that state-sponsored executions allowed sympathy to be
acknowledged but at the same time defused. The condemned receives
the sympathetic absolution he requires, while his death allows any
lingering resentment to be dissipated. The price of this resolution is
perhaps a kind of scapegoating, but if so, it was one that preserved the
social order.
While this "message" might have been understood by Smith's
contemporaries as the articulation of a timeless truth, to propose this
in Scotland in the 1750s was to hint at a very specific referent: the
Stuart rebellion of 1745 and the bloody state executions that followed
upon its failure.
There is little doubt that Smith himself was quite
interested in this rebellion and its consequences for Scotland. While he
was in London dioring the course of the short revolution, his Scottish
citizenship meant that he had to be cautious in making his nationality
known in large public gatherings. Some less discriminatingEnglishmen
were willing to vent their anger at the Stuarts on Scots they found in
England, a fact that no doubt encouraged Smith's reflections on the
mechanisms of scapegoating, resentment, and group dynamics."
Moreover, the extremely unpleasant executions of the rebellion's
leaders occupied the attention of many English, Scottish, and Irish
citizens, and descriptions of these executions were often narrated in
journals and newspapers as explicit lessons in the politics of
sympathy." So, for example, in the April 14, 1747, edition of Faulk-

While The Theoty of Moral Sentiments^ens published in 1759, Smith had first delivered the lectures
that made up the book in the early 1750s, suggesting that the Rebellion provided an even more
obvious unspoken context for his ori^al listeners than in the year of its publication.
" For a brief discussion of the fears of Scots in London during this period, see Ian Simpson Ross,
The Life of Adam Smith (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1995), 81.
" For a brief account of these executions and contemporary reactions to them, see WA. Speck,
TheSutcher'.TheDutee ofCumberland andthe Suppressionof the '•^/(OxfordtBasilBIackwell,1981), 178.
A more extensive treatment of the aftermath of the revolution is provided in Jeremy Black,
Cutloden and the '45 (London: Grange Books, 1990),165-201.
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ner's The Dublin Journal, Lord Lovat's last hours are described in great
detail, establishing a very sympathetic portrait of his stoic resignation
to imminent death.^^ Yet following this description is an unsigned
poem that urges its readers to adopt the correct stance in the "politics"
of pity and sympathy:
On Lord LOVAT's Execution.
Pity'd by gentle Minds Kilmarnock dy'd;
The Brave, Balmerino, were on thy Side;
Radcliffe, xmhappy in his Crimes of Youth,
Steady in what he still mistook for Truth,
Beheld his Death so decently unmov'd.
The Soft lamented, and the Brave approved.
But Lovat's End indiff rently we view.
True to no King, to no religion true:
No Fair forgets the Ruin he has done;
No Child laments the Tyrant of his Son;
No Tory pities, thinking what he was;
No Whig compassions, for he left the Cause;
The Brave regret not, for he was not brave;
The Honest mourn not, knowing him a K
.
The narrative description of Lovat and the poem that follows thus
stage a battle for the reader's sympathies, the narrative eliciting
sympathy, while the poem commands (under the guise of description)
that we view Lovat's end "indiff rently." The poem presents the image
of a nation (men, women, children, Tories, and Whigs) unified around
this execution, but denies that this unity should be based on a collective
sympathy for the condemned. While Hume, Burke, and Smith would
no doubt contest the particiolars of this anonymous poet's conclusion,
all four agree that executions serve as important sites for the mediation
of national unity and sympathy. The poem thus further demonstrates

" Smith probably would not have seen The Dublin Journal, but Burke almost certainly did. James
T. Boulton suggests that Lovat's execution stands as the likely referent of Burke's execution
example in the Enquiry,see Boulton's editor's note in Burke,..4 PUlosophital Enquiry, 47.
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the dose connection between sympathy and executions that obtained
in the post-1745 period.'®
While reference to the Stuart Rebellion remains implidt in The
Theory ofMoral Sentiments, Smith is more forthright in a series of lectures
that he delivered in 1762-63 (now known as the Lectures on Jurisprudence}
and in his private correspondence.'^ So, for example, in a discussion
of the means that a central government must employ to control
territory at its periphery. Smith notes that local lords were frequendy
granted executive powers of jurisdiction, up to and induding the right
to execute individuals. This was recently true even in Scotland, Smith
reminds his listeners, for, "[t]ill the time of the Rebellion in '45 Mr.
[Donald] Cameron of Lochiel was in the common practise of exerdsing
this priviledge, and even hanging or [illegible word] any offender"
(i.l29). Smith's example emphasixes the fact that Cameron's support
of Prince Charles has cost Scotland its right to execute its dtizens. The
movement of Charles's army across Scotland meant that the Scots bore
the brunt of the revolution's failure, being forced to submit to the
Disarming Act (1746) and the Heritable Jurisdictions (Scotland) Act,
amongst other punishments inflicted by England. Yet Smith suggests
in his next reference to the '45 rebellion that punishment for transgres
sions should not be extended indefinitdy, for "the resentment of the
injured person or his relations...must wear away by time" (ii. 168). So,
for example, the sentence for an individual guilty of treason can more
easily be commuted the longer the period of time from the offense.
"Dr. [Archibald] Cameron," notes Smith, "also was executed in the
year 50 or 51 on the sentence passed on hith in the year 1745. The
government were then [i.e., in 1750 or 1751] not altogether free from
fear of another rebellion, and thought it necessary to take that
precaution. But had he kept out of the way for some years longer he

" For an account of the Irish response to the 1745 invasion, see A. P. I. Samuels, The Eartf Ufe,
Correspondence and Writings of the R/. Hon. Edmund iurke (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press,
1923), 89-90. For more general discussions of the role of class in eighteenth-century execudons,
see Randall McGowen "The Body and Punishment in Eighteenth-Century England," Journal of
Modem History 59 (December 1987), 651-79; Gatrell, The Hanffng Tree, 225-36, 280-94, and
Linebaugh, The London Hanged, 74—188.
" For questions relating to the dating of the Lectures, see the editors' "Introduction" to Adam
Smith, hectares on Jurisprudence (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982), 5. All citations are referenced
as part-manuscript page number (e.g, i.l29).
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would probably have been altogether safe" (ii.l74).^® Executions,
suggests Smith, may be the necessary solution to resentment in the
short term, but they may be avoided in cases in which the original acts
of violence lie in the distant past. Yet we might read the "he" of this
example as a sort of synecdoche, such that the subtext of the example
is the suggestion that Scotland itself might now be forgiven, and the
retributive measures lifted.
Smith continued his reflections on the impact of the rebellion on
Scotland in his private correspondence between 1745 and 1759. In a
1757 letter to Gilbert Elliot, for example. Smith noted that he and
many others were angry with the "Lincolnshire mobs" who had taken
to the streets protesting the formation of militias in England. While
the protesters were reacting primarily to the fact that the Militia Act of
May 1757 did not guarantee militiamen any pay, Scots such as Smith
saw this as an attack on the notion of militias in general, and thus an
oblique attack on the future possibility of a Scottish militia (still banned
in 1757). Snuth proposed that executions would solve the problem,
noting that the mobs "provoke our severest indignation for opposing
the militia and we hope to hear that the ringleaders are all to be
hanged."*' Smith's solution mirrors the lesson of "resentment" in The
Theory of Moral Sentiments, that the potentially contagious effects of mob
violence must be resolved by application of state-sponsored executions.
Moreover, there is also a strange sort of chiasmatic logic at work here,
for just as the executions of the Stuart rebellion's leaders inaugurated
the end of militias in Scotland, Smith hints that the executions of
English anti-militia protesters might initiate the reemergence of
Scottish militias.
Yet even as Smith privately complained about the consequences
for Scotland of the Stuart rebellion, he could not avoid being aware
that his career had been enabled by these same aftereffects. His
1750/51 lectureship at Glasgow, for example, was a more or less direct
consequence of the larger attempt by the Scottish elite to discourage
potential future uprisings by inculcating in Scottish youth what Ian
Simpson Ross calls "that 'polite and useful learning' appropriate for

" Smith's editors note that Cameron was actually executed in London in 1753, rather than 1750
or 1751, as Smith suggests (Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence 138n.26).
" Smith to Eliot, 7 September 1757, in Adam Smith, Correspondence of Adam Smith (Indianapolis:
Liberty Fund, 1987), 21-22.
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gentlemen and necessary for the practice of their professions, also for
attaching them to English culture."^ Thus, despite his absence from
Scotland during its engagement with the politics of factional violence.
Smith was surrounded (and in a sense, enabled) by its aftereffects. This
made for a rather ambivalent position, for while he may have personally
opposed some of the English countermeasures, he also implicitly
accepted the right of the English state to make these decisions.
Within the text of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith's discussion
of resentment and executions allows for implicit reference to these
political events, while at the same forestalling the criticism that would
have resulted from any sort of explicit mention of the recent rebellion.
Within Smith's moral philosophy, sympathy plays the roles of both
initiating and dissipating conflict, and his implicit references to recent
political history seem designed to mirror this double movement, both
stirring up, while eventually quelling, the resentment that initiated and
attended those events.

IV: Conclusion
The discursive connections between sympathy, factional violence, and
executions consolidated by Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments did
not disappear in the later decades of the eighteenth century, but the
valence of the elements within this constellation shifted. Smith's
optimistic hope that executions might serve as opportunities for
S3rmpathy to diffuse its disruptive potential gradually gave way to a
more pessimistic belief that sympathy and state-sponsored justice were
opposed to one another. Several different strategies helped serve to
dissociate sympathy from executions. Some commentators, such as
James Boswell (himself a student of Smith in 1759-60), emphasixed the
emotional cost of the experience of viewing an execution. So, for
example, in the case of the 1774 execution of John Reid (a thief whom
Boswell had defended successfully against charges of theft in 1766),
Boswell contended that sympathy caused him to suffer far more than
Reid himself. "I had by sympathy sucked the dismal ideas of John
Reid's situation," Boswell writes, "and as spirits or sustenance of any
' Simpson, IJft of Adam Smith, 83.
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kind, when transferred to another body of a more delicate nature, will
have much more influence than on the body from which it is trans
ferred, so I suffered much more than John cUd."^' While Boswell did
not suggest that his own suffering was morally problematic (and in fact,
he positioned his experience as a sort of moral triumph), he neverthe
less emphasixed the potential affective dangers that awaited execution
spectators.
Other commentators agreed with Smith that executions benefited
society, but denied that sympathy was the mechanism of this effect.
Joshua Reynolds, for example, suggested that executions were
therapeutic for spectators so long as sympathy was kept out of play.
Defending himself against claims that he had attended an execution for
questionable reasons, Reynolds wrote to Boswell that
I consider it...natural to desire to see such sights [i.e.,
executions], and, if I may venture, to take delight in them, in
order to stir and interest the mind, to give it some emotion,
as moderate exercise is necessary for the body....If the
criminals had expressed great agony of mind, the spectators
must infallibly sympathise; hut so far was the fact from it,
that you regard with admiration the serenity of their counte
nances and whole deportment.^
Reynolds, like Smith, believed that a condemned individual's calm
deportment in the face of death provided spectators with an opportu
nity for a "therapy," of sorts. However, where Smith explained this
therapy as a function of sympathy, for Reynolds, the spectators' delight,
and consequent mental exercise, was predicated on a lack of sympathy
with the sufferer. Samuel Romilly advanced another strategy that
divorced sympathy from executions, suggesting that sympathy hindered
the "exemplary" function of public executions. "The spectators,"
wrote Romilly,

" Boswell, dted in Gatrell, The Hangng Tree, 290. For useful accounts of Boswell on sympathy
and executions, see Gatrell, The Hanffng Tree, 284—94 and Gordon TumbuU, "Boswell and
Sympathy; The Trial and Execution of John Reid," in Greg Clingjiam, ed., Neiv Light on Boswelk
Criticism and Historical Esscffs on the Occasion of the Bicentenary of The Life of J ohnson (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 104-15.
" Reynolds cited in V. A, C. Gatrell, The Hanging Tree, 262.
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seem to contemplate not the punishment of a criminal, but
merely the death of an individual; and the sentiments with
which they go away impressed, are, not the justice of the law,
and the danger of violating it, but of compassion for a fellow
creature, to whose suffering they have been witnesses.^
For Romilly, sympathy threatened to divert the attentions of the
spectators from the status of the execution as an example of just
punishment. He positioned "justice" and "compassion" as two
opposed forces, hinting that sympathy might serve not to diffuse, but
rather to aggravate, the causes of social disorder.
These later theories represent a more general movement away
from Smith's understanding of sympathy as a force that divides as
much as it unites (or, more precisely, unites only because it can also
divide). Sympathy gradually became (and to a large extent remains)
understood ,as a force of harmony and moderation, and therefore
opposed to any sort of bonding that could result in violence and
faction. Yet Smith's view of sympathy was more expansive, intended
to account for "good" as well as "bad" forms of social bonding. This
was no doubt in part a function of the fact that The Theory of Moral
Sentiments engaged not only a pre-existing debate on the connections
between sentiment, violence, and executions, but also elements of
Smith's social milieu that encouraged reflection on faction and
violence. Thus, while Hume and Burke simply hinted at connections
between executions and sympathy. Smith's interest in the consequences
of faction for Scodand motivated him to develop a sophisticated
account of the ways in which sympathy served to consolidate the
interests of justice, violence, and social order. While Smith's moral
philosophy should not be understood as simply a "reflection" of the
political tensions that traversed Scotland in the 1740s and '50s, his
attempt to position sympathy as both cause and solution of social
violence was no doubt at least partially motivated by these specific
conflicts and their aftereffects within Scotland.^

^ Samuel Romilly, Observatiotis on a Late Publication Entitled Thoughts on Executive Justice, dted in
Randall McGowen"The Bodyand Punishment in Eighteenth-Centmy
JournalcfModem
History 59 (December 1987), 671.
" My thanks go to Evan Gotdieb for allowing me to present an early version of this paper at the
CSECS/ECSS conference and to George Ervingand Regina Janes for helpful comments.

